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Sandrine Berges (S.B.) :- “S.B.:  In your forthcoming book, Disadvantage, which you co-
wrote with Avner de-Shalit, you argue that the best way to promote equality, is to 
study the nature of disadvantage, specifically, to give an account of disadvantage 
rich enough to connect to the kind of things that real life people suffer from. One of 
the first conclusions you draw from your attempt at defining disadvantage is that 
disadvantage is ‘plural’ and that therefore compensation in the form of cash transfer 
cannot always be a good way of redressing disadvantage. Could you clarify this?”  
 
Jonathan Wolff (J.W.) :-“ It is true that if disadvantage is plural, cash compensation cannot 
always be the right way of addressing disadvantage. In fact, though, in the first 
chapter of our book we argue for the opposite conditional: we try to argue for 
pluralism on the basis of the inappropriateness of cash compensation as an exclusive 
form of remedy. In essence, we think that if monism about well-being is true, then 
there could never be a principled objection to cash compensation (if it is acceptable 
in at least one case). But there are principled objections. Therefore, we argue, 
monism must be false. 
 
                                            
1 A short biography of Pr. Wolff follows the interview. 
Interview with Pr. Jonathan WOLFF 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 4 (2), 2006,  
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
2 
The idea that cash compensation cannot always be the right way to address injustice 
or some other form of disadvantage became apparent to me when I was working on 
my paper ‘Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos’, published in Philosophy and 
Public Affairs in 1998. The main argument of that paper was that conditional 
schemes of benefits, as apparently recommended by those theories such as 
Dworkin’s now known as luck egalitarianism, can be humiliating. There are 
circumstances in which people will have to argue that they are untalented in order to 
claim benefits, and this can undermine their self-respect and their standing in the 
eyes of others. I say much more about this in answer to question 4 below, but here 
the salient point is that in that paper I argued that it would do no good to recognize 
that detailed scrutiny is humiliating and then offer people cash to compensate them 
for this humiliation. It would not remove the humiliation but perhaps compound it. 
Rather we need to explore ways of arranging society so that people are not 
humiliated. 
 
There are many similar examples. Children brought up in orphanages in the UK very 
rarely go to university. It seems clear that this is an injustice, but paying cash to 
compensate seems the wrong way to go about improving the situation. In fact, we 
argue that forms of remedy can go wrong in at least two different ways. First, there 
is the problem of ‘mismatch’: cash just won’t solve the problem, in some cases. 
Second, there is the problem of stigma. Sometimes ways of helping people can be 
patronizing, humiliating or oppressive. For example providing soup kitchens for 
people who are poor and hungry does not suffer from the problem of mismatch, but 
instead announce to the world that anyone served is in poverty and in need of help. 
This is not something that everyone would want others to know about them. 
However the problem of stigma is an example of a broader phenomenon; that 
improving someone’s life in one respect can make them worse off in others. This has 
both a practical and theoretical consequence.  
 
In practical terms, governments have often been accused of taking steps in order to 
achieve one particular objective, but in doing so they can cause harms in other ways. 
One example we use in our book is the policy of clearing slum housing and re-
housing the former residents in tower blocks, which took place in the UK during the 
1960s and 1970s. People who had lived in very poor housing were given new homes 
with much better sanitation, heating, and cooking facilities, which should have 
improved their lives in significant ways. On the whole they did. But at the same time 
it uprooted people from their communities, increasing social isolation, leading to 
loneliness, alcohol and drug dependence, ill-health, and general lack of support.  
 
In fact, however, quite often the bad effects are avoidable and are the result of a type 
of ‘tunnel vision’. Sometimes policy makers have only a limited number of 
objectives in mind, and may be unaware of the costs of pursuing those objectives in 
the most ‘efficient’ way. It may be that taking some other route would have better 
side effects, and thereby would be clearly better all things considered, even if they 
don’t meet that particular agency’s goals in the very most cost-effective manner. 
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The contribution this type of example makes at the level of theory is that it 
encourages us to accept that well-being is plural. People can be made better off in 
one respect and worse off in another, at the same time and through the same policy, 
yet it may be hard to say – perhaps impossible to say – whether all things considered 
they have become better off or worse off, overall.” 
 
 
S.B.: -“ Your work, whether in the above mentioned book, or in the many articles you have 
published on equality, tends to focus on addressing disadvantage within the nation 
state. In your book, however, you appeal to the capability approach which has been 
mainly used in global contexts. Did you encounter any difficulties in applying the 
views of Sen and Nussbaum to national problems?” 
 
J.W.: -“ The capability approach suffers from a difficulty that all pluralist theories of equality 
share: if there is an irreducible plurality of sources of well-being, then how can we 
judge whether well-being is equal or unequal, or who is least advantaged amongst 
people who do badly in different ways? This is what we call the ‘indexing problem’. 
It seems as if some sort of weighting function is required with which to assign values 
to different categories if we are to produce an informative social ordering. Yet how 
is the theorist to derive a unique, firmly grounded, weighting function? However, in 
the context of the developing world this theoretical problem can be side-stepped. 
Where an individual falls below a very basic threshold level on a range of 
functionings – where they are in a form of absolute deprivation - it is clear that there 
is an urgent priority to bring that person up to the basic threshold, if that is possible. 
In the world’s poorest countries, and even in the developing world there are huge 
numbers of people in that position, and so from the point of view of egalitarian 
justice the urgent task is to overcome this sort of absolute deprivation. Once this has 
been done the challenge of meeting the indexing problem will arise, but for the 
foreseeable future this task can be put to one side. 
 
When we move to the developed world thankfully relatively few people are in the 
position of absolute deprivation. However we can hardly argue that for this reason 
the task of egalitarian social justice is complete. Accordingly it is necessary to go 
further; we argue that the immediate task of governments is to identify the least 
advantaged and to take steps so that their lives are improved. This, it appears, heads 
us straight into the indexing problem.   
 
To avoid this one possible response would be to appeal to a type of ‘spheres of 
justice’ approach, and argue that there is no need for an overall index of advantage 
and disadvantage. On such a view each type of disadvantage should be treated on its 
own merits. Those who are in poor health have a claim for medical assistance, 
whatever else is true of them; those who have poor housing have a claim for better 
housing, and so on. On such a view it is possible again, it seems, to define a 
threshold level for each functioning. This time the threshold would not be one of 
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overcoming absolute deprivation, but rather achieving a sufficiency on each 
functioning. 
 
We are sympathetic to this type of approach, but unfortunately it seems to us not to 
work. The problem is that in a world of scarce resources it seems highly unlikely that 
society can bring everyone to a decently high level of sufficiency for all 
functionings. In such a case decisions have to be made about where it is most urgent 
for society to spend its resources. But it seems to us difficult to see how such 
decisions can be made – decisions about priorities in budget allocation – without 
some notion of overall advantage and disadvantage. In other words the indexing 
problem reappears in the context of priority setting. 
 
However, we want to argue that the indexing problem is not as daunting as it may 
seem. This is not because we think that there is a privileged weighting functioning. 
Suppose a survey is made, of experts, of ordinary citizens, of journalists, of policy 
makers, and so on, in order to find out how each of these individuals weight different 
disadvantages. From this survey a range of weighting functions would be produced. 
It would then be possible to apply each weighting function to representative 
individuals and thereby arrive at a set of social orderings of advantage and 
disadvantage. Suppose we now compare those social orderings. It may well be that 
they are fairly similar. In our terms a social ordering is ‘robust’ to the degree that it 
remains the same with a change in weighting functions. Conversely, an ordering is 
‘weighting sensitive’ if it regularly varies to a significant degree with every change 
in weighting function. If the ordering is at least reasonably robust, particularly in the 
lower range, then it is possible to identify the least advantaged in society without 
selecting a particular weighting function as the ‘correct’ one. 
 
However to conduct this exercise would be a lengthy and expensive process. Luckily 
there is a short-cut. Consider what could make a social ordering robust. It seems that 
there are only two possibilities. One is that all the weighting functions under 
consideration are very similar; the other is that disadvantage ‘clusters’: a significant 
number of people are disadvantaged in a number of different ways. Hence, it turns 
out, all we need do is investigate these questions to identify the least advantaged. In 
particular we need to look for people who are disadvantaged in a number of ways; 
these will be among the least advantaged. In short, because people who are 
disadvantaged in one respect are also typically disadvantaged in many others, the 
indexing problem in effect solves itself. I’ll return to this in question 5 below. 
 
In conclusion, applying the capability approach to developed societies does present a 
new theoretical challenge; however we feel it is a challenge that can be met” 
 
S.B.: -“ Conversely could the conclusions you draw about problems specific to the UK or 
Israel be applied to global issues? Would it be a good thing if they could?” 
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J.W.: -“ I think that the question of global justice remains one of the most difficult issues in 
political philosophy. There is, I think, a basic dilemma. Those, especially 
egalitarians, who approach the issue in terms of thinking about justice, feel 
compelled to conclude that justice requires the same rules for those outside our 
national boundaries as well as within them, and therefore an absolutely massive 
programme of redistribution is necessary. Theorists who cannot accept this 
conclusion tend them to find a reason why justice is more restricted in scope and 
argue that our duties to those in other countries are duties of charity, not justice, and 
therefore not as extensive as might be feared. I find both approaches implausible, 
and think that what is needed is ‘justice but not the same justice’. I hope to address 
this in future work, but it is not something that our book considers. 
 
There is, however, one element of the book which is relevant to global issues, and 
that is the issue of risk. In part one of the book we argue for a modification of the 
capability approach which we call the ‘genuine opportunity for secure functioning’ 
approach (more on this in answer to question 6). The issue of risk relates to 
‘security’. We argue that one central aspect of disadvantage is that of having to face 
risks that others do not have to face. Even if one achieves a reasonable level of 
functioning, the insecurity of not being able to have a reasonable guarantee that it 
can be sustained is a disadvantage. Consider people who have temporary 
employment contracts. Even if the pay is the same as those on permanent contracts, 
and even if they never in fact have a period of unemployment, there is a clear sense 
in which they are disadvantaged in comparison to others. Sen’s work uses such 
examples to great effect; such as the honey gatherers of Bengal who in earning a 
living risk death from the Bengal tigers who live in the forests where they collect the 
honey. The odd thing is that Sen himself does not really dwell on this notion of 
exceptional risk. 
 
In our view those who face risk suffer in a number of ways. First, the mere fact of 
being at risk, whether or not this is known by the agent, makes the person worse off. 
(We accept that this is a controversial claim.) Second, the stress and anxiety 
someone lives with can be very serious, and have a constantly depressing effect. 
This, of course, spreads to everyone who is anxious about risk, and not just those 
people who suffer the loss. Third, people can take steps to reduce the risk, perhaps 
by moving house, or changing jobs. However, taking steps to avoid one risk can 
sometimes expose people to other, even more serious risks. After all, the honey 
gatherers risk their lives to reduce the risk that their families will suffer malnutrition. 
Fourth, people can take expensive steps to reduce the impact of the harm, such as 
taking out insurance (although this is of less relevance to the developing world). 
Finally, those facing risk and vulnerability find it harder to plan their lives. For 
example, if a man is expected to pay for an expensive wedding on getting married, 
and needs to borrow money to be paid back over some years, it may be impossible, 
or at least extremely imprudent, to do this until secure employment has been found. 
Hence such decisions may be put off while one’s situation is vulnerable. We call this 
‘planning blight’ and in extreme cases it can lead to a type of paralysis of the will. 
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 This aspect of the analysis of disadvantage has been refined by looking at examples 
both from the developing world and the developed world. Our view is that this is a 
central, pervasive, and, to date, under-theorised, aspect of disadvantage, and our 
analysis should therefore also be of interest to theorists of global justice.” 
 
S.B.: -“ Some of our readers are particularly interested in the place of responsibility for 
ones’ own well being and for that of others in understanding social justice. You seem 
to think that appeals to responsibility can in fact be dangerous in assessing 
disadvantage and working out remedies. Do you think there is any place for 
responsibility in a theory of disadvantage?” 
 
J.W.: -“ In my earlier work, as mentioned in answer to question 1, I argued that investigating 
whether or not people are responsible for their misfortune can have undesirable 
effects. To use an example I have not used before, my mother suffered an industrial 
injury and could not work to the degree she had before. Every year she had to go to 
be examined by a panel of doctors who would in a rather mechanical, offensive and 
patronizing way, require her to undergo a series of tests to determine whether she 
was, in effect, unemployed merely by choice, or whether she had a good reason 
through incapacity. In her case she still suffered from a number of effects, and 
therefore continued to receive benefit, but she found the whole thing utterly 
humiliating. It was humiliating to be called to the panel. It was humiliating to strip 
off in front of them – in an office, rather than a hospital - and then being told to try to 
perform the various actions and exercises to determine her level of disability. And it 
was humiliating to be told that she was still 63% disabled, or whatever the 
judgement was, even though, of course, this is what she needed to be told. The 
general point is that any scheme of conditional benefits requires an investigation into 
who meets the conditions. The testing doesn’t have to be done as badly as it was in 
my mother’s case, but still, it does need to be done. And it can be humiliating for 
those who do meet the conditions. In sum, any system we use to try to filter out 
people who make false claims – or indeed any system to filter out free riders – has 
costs for people who are not free riders and indeed are making genuine claims. In 
many cases these people will also be among the worst off in society. 
 
It is tempting to argue that a system of unconditional benefits – such as a basic 
income scheme – should replace conditional schemes, and certainly they would be 
an improvement in the respect of avoiding humiliation. However, although I am 
highly sympathetic to the theory of basic income – and I think it is one of the most 
inspiring things to emerge from political philosophy in the last few decades – 
nevertheless I have never been entirely comfortable with it. I do not think that it has 
any real chance of being implemented on any scale that would make a significant 
difference. This, I think, is for two related reasons. One is that the cost, and the 
increased tax for the wealthy, make it impossible. In a global economy the most 
likely outcome is that ever more sophisticated forms of tax evasion would result. 
There would not be ‘buy in’ by the rich. And the reason for this may in part be a 
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general feeling that we should not subsidise those who could work but do not: i.e. 
those who are responsible for their own misfortune. Now, we could argue about how 
likely it is that significant numbers of people would exploit a basic income system, 
but there is no getting away from the fact that a very large number of people think 
that a very large number of people (perhaps including themselves) would exploit 
such a system. Therefore, they argue, we cannot do without a theory of 
responsibility. 
 
At one level, my answer is that this is an experimental question. If we introduced a 
system of unconditional benefits and there was a lot of free riding, then we have 
better change it to a more conditional system. However it is highly unlikely that we 
are ever going to be able to conduct that experiment, and furthermore we need to 
have to hand a theory of responsibility to fall back on, just in case. Now although the 
issue of responsibility has dominated egalitarian theory for more than two decades, 
our view is that egalitarianism hasn’t so far delivered what is necessary here. Most 
theories have, in some way, attempted to provide an acceptable version of the theory 
that people should bear the costs of their freely made choices. Suppose we accept 
that this is a good theory. What are its consequences if we actually try to apply it to 
the real world of inequality in which we live? In our book we use the example of a 
single mother, with school age children, who chooses to remain unemployed rather 
than take a low paid job which involves a long commute. According to the choice 
theory of responsibility she should have no right to welfare benefits, as she made a 
free choice. This seems unreasonably harsh.  
 
There seem to be two types of possible response. The first is to argue that she didn’t 
make a free choice. However this places us in what we call a ‘metaphysical swamp’ 
in which impossible decisions need to be made about when people act with freedom. 
Alternatively it might be said that because she has lower well-being, or resources, or 
whatever, than she would have in an equal society, then her choices should be 
subsidised to bring her closer to equality. But the implication of this is that those 
below the level of equality would never have to bear any of the costs of their actions, 
however negligent, stupid or easily avoided. This seems too soft. Hence there is a 
trilemma for the choice view applied to the real world: either too harsh or too 
metaphysically demanding or too soft. 
 
We sketch out an alternative view, where we ask whether it is reasonable for someone to 
bear all, or part, of the cost of their actions. The factors to take into account include 
the cost for them – in terms of its impact on their other functionings – of following a 
particular course of action; the costs for others of their doing so; the similar costs of 
other possible courses of action; and whether they have a social duty to act in any 
particular way. They may be other contextual factors to take into account too, and, of 
course for policy reasons we would need rules of thumb. Nevertheless this is what 
we call the theory of ‘genuine opportunity’. In sum, though, our objection is not so 
much to the idea of responsibility – although we think its importance has been 
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greatly exaggerated – but more to the existing egalitarian theories of responsibility, 
which, we feel, would be greatly damaging if applied to the real world.” 
 
S.B.: -“ One of the most novel and exciting ideas you put forward in your book is that 
disadvantages tend to cluster. That is, people who do badly in one respect, tend to do 
badly in others, so that typically, no matter what category of disadvantage we look 
at, the same people tend to end up at the bottom. Could you say a few words about 
this. Could you also explain how you think this might in practice help us redress 
disadvantages?” 
 
J.W.: -“ The main point of the observation that disadvantages cluster is that because of this 
there is little difficulty in identifying the least advantaged, even if there is 
disagreement about which particular disadvantage is the most serious. However, 
after having made this point it is interesting to reflect on the converse situation: one 
in which disadvantages do not cluster. In such a world it is very unclear who is the 
least advantaged in society; according to one weighting function it would be one 
group, according to another a different one, and so on. Such a world, we conclude, is 
in some sense much closer to equality than the actual world. Hence we derive a 
policy proposal: governments should attempt to decluster disadvantage: to make a 
matter of controversy whether each group in society is near the top or near the 
bottom of the heap. 
 
Of course there are good ways and bad ways of attempting to decluster disadvantage. 
We argue that a good way would be for governments to identify what we call 
‘corrosive disadvantages’ and ‘fertile functionings’. The former are those 
disadvantages which lead to further disadvantages; the latter are functionings which 
assist the achievement of other functionings. It is for social scientists to tell us which 
disadvantages are corrosive and which functionings fertile (we have some discussion 
of this), and for government to boost spending to prevent people developing 
corrosive disadvantages and to encourage them to develop fertile functionings.” 
 
S.B.: -“ Although you say a lot of good things about the capability approach and seem 
mostly sympathetic with the work of Sen and Nussbaum, you also express a certain 
amount of skepticism about the need to introduce a concept of capabilities over and 
beyond functionings. Could you please explain this?” 
 
J.W.: -“ Very many people seem to have accepted with little question that the concept of 
capability to function is the right way to understand a theory of well-being: what 
matters is what people are capable of, rather than what they achieve. There seem to 
be a number of advantages here: it emphasises freedom, allows space for individual 
responsibility, and seems anti-paternalistic. Nevertheless it does introduce huge 
complexities into the theory. It may be hard to measure an individual’s functioning 
level, but it is much harder to measure their capability to function, given that a 
‘capability set’ allows an individual to achieve a wide array of different sets of 
functionings – that is its point. It is not straightforward even thinking how to 
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represent an individual’s capability set. Measuring capabilities, and implementing 
policies on this basis seems very difficult. 
 
That difficulty, though, is not a sufficient reason for abandoning capability theory. 
However it is a good reason for re-examining its motivations. Sen introduces the 
distinction in the context of discussing a wealthy person who is fasting, and hence 
has a low level of nutrition. Sen compares this person to someone how is equally 
poorly-nourished, but in this case because of poverty and lack of access to food. Sen 
rightly says that the rich person does not have an equal claim for government help. 
Yet for a theorist who generally has such a good feel for empirical reality one has to 
ask whether he has produced an example which will generalise. Voluntarily 
malnourished wealthy people are fairly rare. Given the complexity it introduces into 
the theory, one wonders whether this is a sufficient reason for moving to a capability 
approach. 
 
But of course there are more significant cases of a similar type. I have already 
mentioned voluntary unemployment. Some conservatives believe that the world is 
full of people who could work but choose not to. It is also widely believed that many 
people bring ill health upon themselves through poor lifestyle choices. In these 
cases, then, do we want to say that such people had a capability for a better 
functioning, and therefore the government owes them nothing? Or do we prefer to 
say that in many cases, actually, they don’t have the capability? How do we decide? 
 
When we start to look at these issues we see that the capability approach is much 
more vague than people have assumed. Roughly a capability is an opportunity to 
function, and to have an opportunity for x, roughly again, is to be able to achieve x 
on fulfillment of a particular condition. So now everything comes down to what we 
put into those conditions. Here the capability view is typically silent (although there 
may be some theorists who have addressed this in detail). The conditions can be 
simple (just raise your hand!) or very demanding (change your diet, your job and 
your social life). In place of the idea of capability we offer our ‘genuine opportunity 
view’, or rather the ‘genuine opportunity for secure functioning’ taking account of 
risk too. We offer this in the spirit of a friendly modification and development of the 
capability theory, rather than supposing that we have, in some way, refuted the 
capability view. We have uncovered some gaps and have tried to sketch a way of 
filling them in.” 
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